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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
that neither partner was entitled to judgment against the other, since the amount due
each could not be determined.
The supreme court reversed, holding that in the absence of agreement the rights
and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership are governed by the provisions
of the Uniform Partnership Act, RCWr 25.04.180, which provides (1) that each
partner must contribute toward the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained
by the partnership according to his share in the profits and (2) that no partner is
entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership business. Applying this to the
instant case, the managing partner was required to recompense his co-partner for one
half the losses sustained on his capital contribution.
The Uniform Partnership Act thus operates to require a partner who contributes
only services, in the absence of agreement, to risk not only receiving nothing for his
services but also being required to indemnify his partner against capital losses. See
CRANE, PARTNERSHIP § 65, p. 345 (2d ed. 1952) ; Note, 24 COLUM. L. REv. 508 (1924).
A party should guard against the result in the Richert case by taking care to fix his
respective liability in advance by express agreement.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Summary Judgment. In Capital Hill Methodist Church v. Seattle,'
the Washington court reviewed for the first time a case involving an
application of Rule 19(1) of the Washington Rules of Pleading,
Practice and Procedure,2 dealing with motions for summary judg-
ments.3
The case involved a petition by non-abutting property owners
seeking to enjoin enforcement of a Seattle city ordinance providing
for the vacation of a public street in response to a petition by the
defendant Group Health Cooperative. The plaintiffs' complaint alleged
1152 Wash. Dec. 305, 324 P.2d 1113 (1958). For a discussion of the substantive
points involved in the case, see casenote, page 212, this issue.
2 34A Wn.2d, Cumulative Supplement July 1957, page 29, which reads, in part:
1. Summary Judgment: (a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover
upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim, or to obtain a declaratory judg-
ment may, at any time after the expiration of the period within which the
defendant is required to appear, or after a service of a motion for summary
judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. (b) For
Defendant Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
his favor as to all or any part thereof. (c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon.
The motion shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party, prior to the day of hearing, may serve oppos-
ing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of lia-
bility alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
Omitted are sections (d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion; (e)
Form of Affidavits' Further Testimony; (f) When Affidavits are Unavail-
able and (g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith.
As adopted by Washington originally in 1951, Rule 19(1) was a limited version
of its present text, including only the present sections (a) and (b), leaving open for
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several types of special damages resulting from the vacation, all of
which were denied by the defendants. The defendants moved for
summary judgment, which was granted by the trial court and affirmed
by the supreme court, upon a determination that there existed no
genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial on the merits.
A motion for summary judgment has a broader range of use than
either a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings as a tool
for obtaining early disposition of litigation, since it does not require
that facts well pleaded be admitted, but permits a view behind the
scenes to discover whether the facts can be substantiated.
The object of the procedure is to separate formal and sham issues
from the genuine issues raised by the pleadings. To attain this object
the court must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue of facts,
but to discover if any real issue exists.' Only if it is perfectly clear
that there are no genuine issues of material fact should a summary
judgment be granted.'
An appreciation of the advantages and pitfalls which may be
encountered in its application may be gained by an analysis of the
procedure utilized by the defendants in the instant case, resulting in
a judgment of dismissal within less than two months of the service
of the complaint.
A defendant can move for summary judgment "at any time." I In
this case the defendant city's motion was made seventeen days after
service of the complaint.
The motion may be supported by affidavits.' The moving party
has the burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of
material fact, and any doubts should be resolved against the moving
party.' Hence, whether and to what extent affidavits should be used
will depend upon the extent to which facts relied upon (to establish
question all details of procedure. In consequence it was of little practical value. Effec-
tive November 1, 1955, it was amended to include the remaining sections and in its
present text substantially duplicates Federal Practice and Procedure Rule 56.
4 Walling v. Fairmount Creamery Co., 139 F.2d 318, 322 (8th Cir. 1943).
r Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944) (cited by the court).
See also Cox v. English-American Underwriters, 245 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1957) (cited
by the court), and Kirkpatrick v. Consolidated Underwriters, 227 F.2d 228 (4th Cir.
1955), and the decisions cited therein suggesting cautious application.
0 Rule 19(1) (b). A plaintiff, however, must allow the time permitted for answer
to expire before moving for summary judgment. Rule 19(1) (a). The only other
time limitation is that the motion be served at least ten days before date fixed for
hearing. Rule 19(1) (c). This precludes an original motion for summary jdugment
at any time after ten days before the trial date.
7 Rule 19(1) (a) and (b). The court's consideration, however, is not limited to
the pleadings and affidavits, since Rule 19(1) (c) states that the "pleadings, deposi-
tions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any" may be considered.
8 W\alling v. Fairmount Creamery Co., 139 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1943).
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absence of genuine issues of material fact) are already before the
court through pleadings and discovery proceedings.
In the present case, as appears from the court's decision, with the
exception of two of plaintiffs' allegations, factual disputes raised by
the pleadings could have been resolved in favor of the plaintiffs, and
the defendants would still have been entitled to judgment as a matter
of law; issues of fact existed, but they were not material to the out-
come of the litigation.' The plaintiffs' complaint, however, alleged
two types of special damages resulting from the vacation which, if
proved, might have entitled them to the injunction they sought: that
the street vacation interfered with the most direct and convenient
access to their properties, and that it created a fire hazard.
Since these factual allegations, denied by the defendants, were
material, the burden was on defendants to establish they were not
genuine. To meet this burden, defendants presented three affidavits.
Two were directed toward establishing that all proceedings in connec-
tion with the vacation ordinance had been in accord with regular prac-
tice. The third was an affidavit of a city engineer, accompanied by a
map which clearly showed the location of the plaintiffs' property in
relation to the vacated street, that the vacated street was a minor
access street only, that two avenues of approach to plaintiffs' proper-
ties from the same direction remained, and that one of the streets so
available was a primary arterial. The total effect was to dispel any
claim that plaintiffs' access had been "substantially" or "unreason-
ably" obstructed, and to place the issue within the language of a
previous case'0 as undeserving of recognition.
As a broad generalization, it may be said that the motion for sum-
mary judgment admits all specific facts well pleaded and that contra-
dictory affidavits cannot be used to eliminate such facts from issue.
But where a general statement in a pleading is shown by specific facts
stated in affidavits to be untrue, the foundation is laid for elimination
of that fact from issue." Thus, it will be seen that, in accepting the
defendant's specific facts as against the plaintiffs' general allegations
of interference with access, the court would not be determining a
factual issue but would be determining that the issue was not genuine.
9 This preliminary examination of factual issues will determine whether, as a matter
of strategy, resort should be had to Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 26-32
(depositions) ; 33 (interrogatories); 34 (discovery and production of documents,
etc.), or 36 (admissions), or whether affidavits will be sufficient to establish lack of
substance in the opposing parties' allegations.
10 Mottman v. Olympia, 45 Wash. 361, 88 Pac. 579 (1907).
11 Suckow Borax Mines Consol. v. Borax Consol., 185 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1950).
[VOL-. 34
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When the moving party presents evidence which, if believed, would
entitle him to judgment, the opposing party must either discredit that
evidence or show that he has evidence of a substantial character on
at least one issue which, if believed, would entitle him to judgment. 2
Thus, a determination of whether and to what extent to use counter-
affidavits will depend upon the circumstances of each case. They are
not required, but it would seem that in most cases they will be not only
advisable but essential.13
In opposing the motion in this case, the plaintiffs presented only one
affidavit-by the plaintiff who had signed the complaint, alleging per-
sonal knowledge of the facts stated in that complaint, that they were
true and correct, and repeating allegations as to creation of a fire
hazard. These allegations were based on a letter written by the chief
of the Seattle fire department, a copy of which was attached to the
plaintiff's affidavit.
At the hearing on the motion, 4 objections were raised to the form
of the affidavits submitted as not being in compliance wtih Rule
19 (1) (e), and a continuance was granted to permit compliance.
Rule 19 (1) (e) requires that affidavits "be of personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affliant is competent to testify to the mat-
ters stated therein." Thus, statements as to opinion, belief, or con-
clusions of law," or statements inadmissible as hearsay, 6 may be
disregarded.
The plaintiff's affidavit wholly failed to comply with these require-
ments. It is not sufficient to assert that the affiant has personal knowl-
edge, but it must be affirmatively shown that he possesses the knowl-
edge asserted.' The affidavit showed lack of knowledge as to factors
creating the alleged fire hazard, since the affiant relied on a letter to
sustain the allegations in this regard, and the letter attached was itself
hearsay.
12 Gifford v. Travellers Protective Ass'n, 153 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1946).
13 Albert Dickinson Co. v. Mellos Peanut Co., 179 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1950).14 The Superior Court for King County adopted, as of November 1, 1958, an experi-
mental policy in connection with motions for summary judgment. It requires that the
moving party submit a statement of fact upon which reliance is had, with appropriate
citations from the record, and a brief on the law supporting his motion, to be served
on opposing counsel at least five days before noting the motion for hearing; that the
opposing counsel serve and file his brief at least one day prior to the hearing; and
that copies of the brief be furnished to the judge hearing the motion at the earliest
opportunity to permit the court to familiarize itself with the issues prior to argument.
'5 Dewey v. Clark, 180 F.2d 766, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
16 Jameson v. Jameson, 176 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
17 Walling v. Fairmount Creamery Co., 139 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1943).
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The trial court ultimately granted the defendant's motion, and the
supreme court affirmed this action. In reaching this determination,
the supreme court, in terms of the basic test set forth in the rule
itself, inquired merely as to whether the case presented a genuine
issue of material fact requiring a trial on the merits and found the
record did not present such an issue.
No general formula can be used in determining whether, in a spe-
cific case, there exists an issue requiring a trial. Each case must be
decided on its own record. However, in this regard the Washington
attorney can feel on somewhat familiar ground. As pointed out in
the Gifford case,"8 summary judgment is justified under the same cir-
cumstances justifying a directed verdict. Hence, the opposing party
is entitled to the same favorable inferences from unchallenged allega-
tions in pleadings, affidavits, and other facts before the court as could
be drawn from evidence actually presented in a trial if he were oppos-
ing a motion for directed verdict. 9
In the present case, one of the theories upon which plaintiffs pro-
ceeded in seeking an injunction against enforcement of the street
vacation ordinance was that they possessed a vested right in the
street, in the form of an easement resulting from estoppel, which
would be affected by the vacation. One of the factors to be affirma-
tively proven by the plaintiffs in establishing such easement was
deraignment of title by plaintiffs and defendants from a common
grantor. Their complaint, however, failed to allege title through a
common grantor. When this deficiency was brought to the attention
of the court in the summary judgment proceedings, the plaintiffs made
no move to amend their complaint, nor did they present any evidence
indicating that they could establish this fact on trial.2" Instead, they
relied on an inference of deraignment of title from facts pleaded in
their complaint. Whether such an inference was justified was not
determined by the supreme court.
Though summary judgment is still a new procedure in the State
of Washington, it stands as an effective tool for attorneys anxious to
avoid the crowded trial calendars and the expense of trial in those
situations where, at best, the opponent has only a slim bid for relief,
and, at worst, he makes formal allegations designed only to delay
18 Gifford v. Travellers Protective Ass'n, 153 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1946).
19 Dulansky v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 191 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1951).
20 If facts presented by affidavit or otherwise upon hearing motion for summary
judgment justify an amendment, amendment should be permitted. Hartman v. Times,
Inc., 64 F.Supp. 671, 680 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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entry of judgment in a case where the relief sought is certain to be
granted. A careful reading of the text of the rule will, for most pur-
poses, serve to educate the attorney who has not used it before. For
more detailed points there is a wealth of federal case law, developed
in twenty years' experience with substantially the same rule.
MARJORIE D. ROMBAuER
Misconduct of a Party-Shadowing Jurors. In Coats v. Lee &
Eastes' the Washington court ruled it was not an abuse of discretion
to deny a motion for a new trial sought on the basis of alleged mis-
conduct of the defendants in having a juror "shadowed" during the
trial of a personal injury action.
The juror's affidavit, which was submitted in support of the motion,
stated he had been advised he was being followed by a detective
employed by defendants, that he believed he was being followed, and
that the resultant annoyance and disturbance had made him appre-
hensive and "might possibly have prevented his free exercise of judg-
ment." Other affidavits presented by plaintiffs tended to establish the
investigator had stated to third persons that he was following the
juror.
Defendants denied any intentional surveillance of the juror. Their
affidavits stated that after they had exhausted their challenges a
juror had admitted on examination that he knew one of the plain-
tiffs fairly well and had seen him around his place of employment.
Investigation later revealed that they were actually employed by the
same establishment, and a private investigator had been employed to
follow the plaintiff in order to ascertain whether he attempted to con-
tact the juror. Other affidavits tended to establish that such surveil-
lance of the juror as occurred was incidental to observation of the
plaintiff. The trial court, in denying a new trial, accepted the defend-
ants' version of what had occurred.
The supreme court pointed out that it would be the duty of a trial
court to order a new trial if anything was brought to his attention
which might tend to "interfere with the calm and fair judgment of
any particular juror," but concluded that because the trial judge had
been able to observe the afflants, including the juror, throughout the
trial, he was much better qualified to give proper weight to each
affidavit. Recognizing the wide discretion in a trial court in passing
151 Wn.2d 542, 320 P.2d 292 (1958).
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upon a motion for a new trial, the court found no abuse of that dis-
cretion.
In Commonwealth v. Corcoran,' upon which defendants relied but
which was not cited by the court, a Massachusetts court reached the
same conclusion in a case where the commonwealth had admittedly
had two jurors followed during the course of a criminal trial. After
conviction the defendants moved for a new trial on the ground the
surveillance had intimidated the jurors, and, as in the instant case, the
motion was heard on conflicting affidavits. The trial court found the
detectives had been hired to shadow the jurors for the purpose of
protection and denied the motion. On appeal the court ruled that the
trial judge had a right to discredit the affidavits presented by the
defendants and found no abuse of discretion, without discussion as
to the propriety of the shadowing activities.
In the instant case the trial court found there had been no inten-
tional surveillance of the juror. Despite this finding, a dissent urged
reversal in order to place the "stamp of severe judicial disapproval"
upon what had happened in this case. In effect, this was done by
dictum by the majority in pointing out that "tampering with the jury
would not be tolerated," and by observing that in Sinclair v. United
States3 the "employment of detectives by defendants in a criminal
case to shadow the jurors amounted to a contempt of court, even
though none of the persons engaged in such shadowing approached
or communicated with a juror or attempted to do so." 4
It should be noted that the defendants in the Sinclair case were
charged with contempt of court in having procured the surveillance
and investigation of all the jurors for the purpose of obtaining in-
formation for false charges, intimidation and influence-a charge far
more extensive and serious than the prejudice alleged by plaintiffs
in seeking a new trial. The strong language quoted by the Wash-
ington court from the Sinclair case was actually an attack upon the
defendants' defense that they could not be guilty of contempt because
they had not actually contacted any juror.
Use of the extensive quotations from the Sinclair case in the instant
case seems to infer that, had the private investigator been employed
to follow the juror, the Washington court would have directed a new
trial, on the ground that the possibility of deliberate surveillance
2 252 Mass. 465, 148 N.E. 123 (1952).
-279 U.S. 749 (1929).
4 51 Wn.2d 542, 551, 320 P.2d 292, 298.
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would be sufficient to disturb the ability of a juror to exercise a calm
judgment.
Use of the Sinclair case in this decision also confuses the two ways
in which a charge of juror shadowing may arise: As the ground for a
contempt charge (as in Sinclair) and as the ground for a new trial
(as in the Coats case). In the latter situation, it would seem the
inquiry should be directed solely to whether the conduct had in any
manner interfered with the deliberations of the jury so as to preju-
dice the party seeking the new trial. When a charge of contempt is
based on shadowing jurors, however, the inquiry is directed toward
whether there has been an attempt to influence jurors as a component
part of the court.'
Few cases were found in which the charge of juror following has
been considered by higher courts, and the many unanswered ques-
tions remaining in the two situations in which it may be raised would
seem to make it unwise to procure such surveillance for any reason.
Mnljoput D. ROMBAuEI,
Appeal-Time for Notice of Appeal Cannot be Enlarged. In Cohen, v. Stingl,
51 Wn.2d 866, 322 P.2d 873 (1958), both parties submitted proposed findings, conclu-
sions, and judgment. It was stipulated that the judge, who was from another county,
would take them to his home and determine which he would sign. Eight days later he
signed those proposed by the plaintiff and returned them to the clerk, a copy of the
letter of transmittal going to both parties. Seven months later counsel for defendants
expressed surprise that the judgment had been entered and, claiming lack of notice
as to entry, moved for a new trial. The court then entered an "Order Vacating Date
of Entry of Judgment and Denying Motion for New Trial." This order purported to
change only the date of entry of the original judgment to the then current date. If
effective, this change of date would have made the motion for new trial timely--i.e.,
within the two days permitted for such motion under RCW 4.76.060-and an appeal
from its denial could have been properly taken.
The defendants did appeal from the denial of motion for a new trial, and the plain-
tiffs, ignoring the purported vacation order, moved for a dismissal of the appeal, chal-
lenging the jurisdiction of the court to hear an appeal from the original judgment
because of failure to comply with the provisions of Rules on Appeal 33 (1) (a), which
makes notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of judgment an express jurisdictional
requirement.
The ground relied upon by the trial court for the purported vacation was that the
"failure of the defendants to move against the judgment or appeal therefrom was due
to an excusable neglect," (emphasis by the court) the court apparently relying on
RCW 4.32.240, which permits a party to be relieved of a judgment taken against him
through, inter alia, excusable neglect.
kThe supreme court, however, looked beyond this recital and concluded that it was
not a vacation within the meaning of the statute because not made for the purpose of
G63 A.L.R. 1270 (1929).
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changing any of the terms of the judgment It ruled the new judgment was void as an
obvious attempt to "revive the time for taking an appeal" and dismissed the appeal.
RCW 4.32.050 expressly provides: "[T]ime for bringing... appeal shall in no case
be enlarged, or a party permitted to bring such ... appeal after the time therefor has
expired."
This is in accord with the view taken by courts which have considered similar "vaca-
tions." Cases are collected in 89 A.L.R. 941 (1933) and 149 A.L.R. 741 (1944).
Service of Process---Leaving Papers in Unattended Office. In Rohr v. Baker, 52
Wn.2d 903, 329 P.2d 848 (1958), service of a motion for default was effected by the
process server's pushing the documents through the mail slot of the locked office door
of defendant's counsel.
The Washington court reversed dismissal of a petition to vacate the default based
on the form of service, stating that "this was no service at all," under RCW 4.28.240.
This statute permits papers to be served upon an attorney (in those situations in which
such service is allowed) by leaving them in a conspicuous place in his office if there
is no person in the office, but requires that they be left at the attorney's residence if
the office "is not open to admit of such service."
By this decision the court apparently reversed Spencer v. Arlington, 54 Wash. 259,
103 Pac. 30 (1909), which was not cited in the brief of either party or discussed by
the court.
In the Spencer case the court held that service made by dropping the papers through
an open transom above the locked door of appellant's counsel's office was a valid
service within the requirements of the same statute. There an additional factor was
shown: respondent's counsel had seen the papers on a desk in the office of appellant's
counsel the day following the service. But the court's language broadly approved such
a service, even in the absence of that factor. The court rejected the contention that
because the door was locked the office was not "open to admit of such service" (by
placing in a conspicuous place within the office), saying: "[I]t seems to us that the
office was sufficiently open to admit of service by leaving the notice in a conspicuous
place therein if that could be easily accomplished by the use of any opening into the
office." The court further stated in the Spencer case: "It seems to us that on the floor,
and immediately in front of the door on the inside, is a very conspicuous place. Indeed
it is not easy to conceive of a place in the ordinary law office more conspicuous."
Because the Rohr case reached a result contrary to the Spencer case on facts sub-
stantially similar, it seems to represent a shift in the interpretation of RCW 4.28.240.
However, it must be noted that the court appears not to have considered the Spencer
case.
REAL PROPERTY
Easements-Rights of Nonabutting Property Owners. In Capitol
Hill Methodist Church v. City of Seattle,1 nonabutting property own-
ers sought to enjoin (1) the vacation of East John Street between
Fifteenth and Sixteenth Avenues north in Seattle, and (2) the obstruc-
tion of that street by the co-defendant, Group Health, Inc. The plain-
tiffs and the defendants allegedly purchased from a common grantor
in reliance on a plat delineating East John Street as dedicated to
152 Wn.2d 359, 324 P.2d 1113 (1958).
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